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NO. 44862
BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR 2015-16023
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Patrick Lee O’Neil appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation and
executing his underlying sentences. Mr. O’Neil asserts the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentences.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In January of 2016, Mr. O’Neil was charged with two counts of delivery of a controlled
substance, and the State alleged that he was a persistent violator. (R., pp.50-53.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Mr. O’Neil pleaded guilty to the two counts, and the State withdrew the
persistent violator allegation. (R., pp.83-86.) The district court imposed concurrent sentences of
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twelve years, with five years fixed, for each count but suspended the sentences and placed
Mr. O’Neil on probation for seven years, with the condition that he successfully complete the
Bannock County Problem Solving Court. (R., pp.114-16, 138-40.)1
Subsequently, Mr. O’Neil’s probation officer filed a report of a probation violation that
alleged Mr. O’Neil had been terminated from the Bannock County Wood Court program.
(R., p.124.)

Mr. O’Neil admitted to this violation, and the district court later revoked his

probation and executed his underlying sentences. (R., pp.151-53.) Mr. O’Neil then filed a
notice of appeal that was timely from the district court’s order revoking probation. (R., pp.15556.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. O’Neil’s probation and executed
his underlying concurrent sentences of twelve years, with five years fixed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. O’Neil’s Probation And
Executed His Underlying Concurrent Sentences Of Twelve Years, With Five Years Fixed
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First,
the Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second,
“[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court
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There was a typographical error in the original judgment of conviction; it indicated that
Mr. O’Neil’s sentences were ten years, with five years fixed, and seven years indeterminate.
(R., p.115.) As such, the district court later issued an amended judgment of conviction, which
corrected this error. (R., p.139.)
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examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,” however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant’s conduct before and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392
(Ct. App. 1987).
As to the first step in the analysis as it applies to this case, Mr. O’Neil concedes that he
violated a condition of his probation; he admitted that.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.10-22.)

However,

Mr. O’Neil asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and
asserts that the district court should have continued him on probation, or retained jurisdiction so
he could have participated in a rider program.
Mr. O’Neil has serious mental health problems.

He has been diagnosed with a

Schizoaffective Disorder and an Antisocial Personality Disorder.

(Presentence Report

(hereinafter, PSI), p.42.)2 Additionally, the 2016 Mental Health Examination Report indicated
provisional diagnoses of a Major Depressive Disorder, a Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and
“Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Disorder or other disorder of extreme stress.” (PSI,
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All citations to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 45-page electronic document.
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p.22.) When these offenses occurred, Mr. O’Neil was on parole in another case. (PSI, p.9.) And
notably, when his parole officer learned of the new charges, he recommended that Mr. O’Neil’s
parole not be revoked because he thought Mr. O’Neil would benefit from Mental Health Court
instead. (PSI, p.10.) He thought that Mr. O’Neil’s problems could be effectively addressed with
“medication management, education, individual therapy and case management.” (PSI, p.10.)
Unfortunately, Mr. O’Neil was not placed in Mental Health Court but rather the Bannock
County Wood Court. (R., p.124; Tr., p.38, L.21 – p.39, L.3; PSI, p.45.) Mr. O’Neil explained in
a letter to the district court that his goal was to get into a rider program with “intense
programming and re-entry planning.” (PSI, p.45.) He also said that, given his mental health
problems, he thought Mental Health Court would be a great fit for him, but he was “somehow
diverted to Wood Court instead.”

(PSI, p.45.)

And, as his clinician in Wood Court—

Ms. Cleaver—testified at the disposition hearing, Wood Court was not a good fit for him.
Ms. Cleaver explained that, despite Mr. O’Neil’s “very severe history of abuse and
neglect,” he had an extraordinarily “strong moral character.” (Tr., p.18, L.24 – p.19, L.5.) For
example, Ms. Cleaver said that Mr. O’Neil was a kind person who “would voluntarily accept
responsibility for ways that he might have contributed to someone else acting out, or maybe
doing something they shouldn’t have.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.5-11.) Ms. Cleaver explained that this was
unusual for people in Wood Court as they would typically want to “deflect responsibility.”
(Tr. p.19, Ls.12-14.)

Additionally, Ms. Cleaver said that Mr. O’Neil was “remarkably

supportive of other members of the group,” and those people described him as “having a huge
heart.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.15-20.) However, Ms. Cleaver explained that Wood Court was not a good
fit for Mr. O’Neil because of his mental illness. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-8.) She said that this issue was
particularly important in this case because Mr. O’Neil was “not medicated appropriately for . . .
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more than three quarters of his time” in Wood Court. (Tr., p.20, Ls.9-13.) Ms. Cleaver went on
to explain that if a person like Mr. O’Neil has a “dual-diagnosis, severe mental illness and
addiction,” appropriate medication is extremely important because without it, “it is nearly
impossible for them to control their impulses to use, because they’re self-medicating.”3
(Tr., p.20, L.20 – p.21, L.1.)
When the district court asked why Mr. O’Neil was not on his medications, Ms. Cleaver
said that Mr. O’Neil’s Social Security and Medicaid had lapsed while he was in jail, and he did
not have coverage to get his medication. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-14.) She said that Mr. O’Neil “couldn’t
function without” the medication, and he was not able to begin taking it until about “two weeks
prior to being discharged from the program.” (Tr., p.21, L.15 – p.22, L.2.) Ms. Cleaver also
explained that Wood Court was not a good fit for Mr. O’Neil because he was receiving Social
Security disability payments, so he could not work full-time like the other people in the program.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.8-18.) She said that the program was not structured enough for Mr. O’Neil
because “when everybody else was working forty hours a week, he had all of this down time
unmedicated,” and this “was a recipe for disaster.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.16-22.) She went on to
confirm that she felt Wood Court was not the right program for Mr. O’Neil, but this was not
because he was unmotivated. In fact, she emphasized that he went to all of his meetings, and,
unlike many of her clients, he was really trying to take advantage of the program. (Tr., p.25,
Ls.7-18.) Finally, she said that Wood Court had been considering revising the program for
people in Mr. O’Neil’s position, and she thought Mr. O’Neil simply needed a more structured
environment to succeed. (Tr., p.26, Ls.4-22.)

3

Mr. O’Neil admitted that he relapsed during Wood Court. (Tr., p.36, L.20.)
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In light of the fact that Wood Court could not provide the appropriate structure,
Mr. O’Neil’s counsel asked the district court to consider retaining jurisdiction so that Mr. O’Neil
could participate in a therapeutic rider. (Tr., p.32, Ls.2-20.) Mr. O’Neil explained that, when he
was arrested, he hoped to get an opportunity to do a rider because he knew about the
“reinforcement, full-time treatment, and the release planning.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.6-10.) However,
he said that everyone he spoke with—including the Parole Board—said that Mental Health Court
would be a “perfect fit” for him, but then he was not able to get into the program, and Wood
Court “wasn’t the same program.” (Tr., p.36, p.36, Ls.11-19.)
He also admitted that he was “spiraling” without his medications but said that, when he
relapsed, he did not “go on the run” but instead tried something different. (Tr., p.36, Ls.20-25.)
He went to his appointments with Ms. Cleaver and asked her if he could have more
appointments; he also asked his aftercare teacher if he could have extra “one-on-ones” because
he knew those helped him. (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-8.) Nevertheless, he said he continued to have
problems and therefore went to his old therapist who actually took him to the hospital, where he
was admitted. (Tr., p.37, Ls.8-14.) He said he did not admit to using drugs when asked by his
probation officer, and he felt this is why he was discharged from Wood Court. (Tr., p.37, L.18 –
p.38, L.18.) Finally, he noted that he spoke with a hearing officer who was familiar with his case
and told him that, when he was denied from participating in Mental Health Court, the appropriate
thing would have been a therapeutic rider, not Wood Court. (Tr., p.38, L.21 – p.39, L.6.)
Mr. O’Neil’s probation officer testified also. She disagreed with Mr. O’Neil’s clinician.
For example, she testified that she felt Mr. O’Neil did not engage or accept accountability, and
she felt that Wood Court was able to help defendants with mental health issues. (Tr., p.42, L.16
– p.43, L.10.) She also said that Mr. O’Neil hid “behind his mental health diagnosis,” and
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brought a letter that Mr. O’Neil had sent to her, which she claimed showed Mr. O’Neil was
“dealing while he was in Wood Court . . . .” (Tr., p.43, L.21 – p.44, L.16.)4 Mr. O’Neil’s
statement in the letter was as follows: “I justified selling because it supported my habit and told
myself at least I ain’t out robbing and stealing . . . .” As Mr. O’Neil’s counsel pointed out, this
was not an admission to dealing drugs while in Wood Court. (Tr., p.49, Ls.1-9.) He said,
“[T]here is nothing in this letter that says he has been selling drugs any time recently.”
(Tr., p.49, Ls.2-4.) He went on to say, “That doesn’t admit anything was done while he was in
Drug Court or in Wood Court or anything along that line. I think it’s a pretty good letter to
suggest why he is so frustrated and why things haven’t worked out well . . . .” (Tr., p.49, Ls.711.) Mr. O’Neil confirmed this. He said he was referring to the underlying charges for delivery
of a controlled substance and not anything that took place during his time in the problem solving
court. (Tr., p.49, L.25 – p.50, L.20.)
Indeed, the reference to dealing in his letter was clearly regarding his underlying offenses
in this case, not anything he had done while in Wood Court.

While it was evident that

Mr. O’Neil continued to struggle with substance abuse during Wood Court, jumping to the
conclusion—based on his statement in the letter—that he was dealing drugs during this time
indicates that Mr. O’Neil’s probation officer may have been prejudiced against Mr. O’Neil in
some way. It also indicates that Ms. Cleaver, as his clinician, had a more accurate understanding
of his situation and was thus a more credible witness regarding his efforts in Wood Court.
In light of Mr. O’Neil’s serious mental health issues, and the problems he encountered
with the structure of Wood Court, Mr. O’Neil asserts that the district court abused its discretion

4

The district court did not have the letter but had copies made for all the parties. (Tr., p.44, L.7
– p.45, L.9.) As such, a motion to augment the record with the letter is filed contemporaneously
with this brief.
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when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence. Even if the district court
found that probation was not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, the positive aspects of
Mr. O’Neil’s time in Wood Court supported a period of jurisdiction. As Mr. O’Neil’s counsel
argued, a therapeutic rider would provide the kind of “structured setting where giving him
something to do is a part of the deal, doesn’t have anything to do with his Medicaid or Social
Security.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.11-14.) Counsel also pointed out that a rider would provide substance
abuse treatment in an environment where Mr. O’Neil would not have access to illegal substances
and could focus getting clean and staying on his medication plan. (Tr., p.32, Ls.14-20.) Indeed,
given Mr. O’Neil’s unique situation, the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
probation and executed his underlying sentences.

CONCLUSION
Mr. O’Neil respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
probation violation disposition hearing.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2017.

___________/s/______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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